MONITORING REPORT: Targets of EU related disinformation in 2024 (Romania)

Authors: Bianca TOMA, Maria SUCIU, Romanian Center for European Policies 

CRPE is presenting the latest report “Targets of disinformation on European issues in the 2024 election year”, a detailed monitoring of anti-EU narratives and topics that have been promoted, amplified and had a significant impact in the online ecosystem from Romania (online press and social networks) during the last 12 months (September 2023 – September 2024).

The anti-European disinformation network has expanded significantly in recent years, multiplying itself, being often fed by public funds, including through political parties.

In the CRPE’s analysis for the period 2022-2023 entitled “Anti-European disinformation in Romania – audiences and impact, actors and fake news networks”, we have highlighted how conspiracy narratives and their distribution networks have gained growing audiences when tackling themes related to EU strategies, policies or regulations. In 2024, an election year in Romania, the impact of these anti-European narratives – many of them serving the interests of the Kremlin – has increased significantly.

For the year 2024, we monitored the themes and topics of disinformation about European strategies, objectives or regulations. Much of the disinformation targeting the EU was also present in other Member States, but in our work we focused on vulnerabilities and impact on the Romanian information space.

The extent to which the promotion of different anti-EU narratives has an impact in EU Member States depends on several factors such as: the strength, credibility and capacity of their national media, societal resistance to misinformation, the effectiveness of public communication, the accountability of political communication and public discourse.

Key take-aways from monitoring the main anti-European narratives and themes in 2024

  • We are witnessing an increased presence of anti-European themes and a significant amplification of anti-Western narratives in Romania in the online environment, with an increase in the number of channels of dissemination (more and more aggregators are appearing that take up and broadcast certain messages) and with increasing audience.
  • Climate change and EU measures to combat it have continued to be the targets of anti-European messages – with much less amplification and impact in Romania than in other Member States. Misinformation about a so-called ‘climate dictatorship’ or ‘eco-dictatorship’ which would aim to bring back, sooner or later, ‘climate quarantines’ is disseminated by politicians in nationalist, extremist parties. Fake news or misinformation is circulating on topics related to EU measures on the ambitions for 2050 – zero emissions. Online in Romania we come across themes such as “imposing of electric cars”, “replacement of car fleets or banning of diesel cars” or “replacing or banning of traditional fuels in heating and distribution systems”, especially gas-fired power plants. The disinformation surrounding these issues aren’t yet gaining noteworthy impact. Official information on this topic was available as part of communication campaigns about the EU Strategy on Combating Climate Change or the European Green Deal on numerous official channels that have been very present over the past 3 years and with important impact on audiences.
  • European policy themes or topics are still targeted by anti-European “influencers” in nationalist parties. Populist political leaders from parties such as AUR or SOS talk about digital identity, digital dictatorship, digital currencies, or digital wallets, with significant impact on social networks, while the much-needed public communication on these topics is absent. We have raised a red flag since June 2023 regarding these topics, noting that a lot of misinformation and conspiracies had been circulating. A year later, we witness the “cash elimination conspiracy” taking shape after the Romanian Government drafted a piece of legislation concerning “fiscal budgetary measures to ensure Romania’s long-term financial sustainability” which was setting low ceilings for cash payments to reduce tax fraud.
  • Throughout 2024, the impact of anti-European themes through which Russian propaganda trying to induce distrust in the EU has increased: “the EU is collapsing”. One of the most toxic narratives circulating about the European Union is that we are dealing with a ‘dysfunctional’ construct, unable to effectively manage internal and external challenges, on the verge of ‘unraveling’ or ‘falling apart’. This narrative has been adopted and disseminated by populist parties and gained some traction on social networks. Recent trends in opinion polls on Romanians’ trust in the EU confirm that these narratives do have an effect. An IRES poll published on May 9, 2024 shows that 44% of Romanians were expecting a pessimistic future for the European Union. Over 50% of Romanians are still optimistic, but the trend can be quickly reversed. 70% of Romanians remain pro-EU, according to the same survey.
  • In 2024, we saw an increased occurance of the terminology “RO-Exit” online, especially on social networks – with an impact of 55% in Facebook and 20% in Tik Tok. “Ro-Exit” is mentioned more than 7,500 times in online media and social networks in the analyzed period (September 2023 – September 2024). By comparison, the term “Ukrainian refugees” is mentioned 3,428 times. Relevant posts with significant impact also have authors or politicians commenting on the Ro-Exit aftermath and confirm our previous observations: where political communication is pro-active and present, misinformation does not have the same effect.
  • Channels: The preferred channel for dissemination is social media platforms – with Facebook at the forefront – followed by online publications. Tik Tok is also increasing its influence considerably, with spectacular rises year on year.
  • Too often, public perception of European topics is negative or citizens “can’t answer/ don’t know” because the narrative has been taken over by conspiracy-mongers, but also because of an absence of official information from public sources for citizens to turn to.
  • There is little or no public communication on EU themes targeted by disinformation in Romania. Public authorities do not know how to react when a certain topic is targeted by extremists or anti-European nationalists or conspiracists. Too often, central authorities in Romania leave the communication on European regulations, proposals and strategies to Brussels. Examples include: the Green Deal, the “Fit for 55” package, security and energy, energy security, digital market regulations, artificial intelligence, social networking regulation, etc.
  • Political communication is both deficient and duplicitous. It is much more active and it has more resources (both human and material) than the public sector. It is seeking to reach its audience and it either validates or fails to combat misinformation targeting the European Union. Whether this has occurred consciously or not, in recent years we have been witnessing another toxic phenomenon: political communication and political advertising, in particular, contributing to the erosion of trust in mainstream means of communication (online press) – flooding the media with political advertising, a practice we have seen even with regard to European issues (as in the case of the latest report on justice).
  • Politicians at the highest level, from mainstream parties do not fight or, even worse, they feed populist narratives just for the purpose of reaching more people (e.g. the “EU is forcing us to eat insects” narrative taken up by the Minister of Agriculture or some high profile leaders of the Social Democrats who have taken up phrases such as “slaves of Europe” and have used them in their political or government strategies – just to reach categories of voters)

The full report can be found here.